Free Preview. Buy eBook. Buy Hardcover. Final Remarks References Notes. Monetization in the Transition Economies Compared 3. Inflation and Monetization 3. Factors Determining Monetization in the Transition Economies 3. The Shadow Economy 3.
Currency-Board Arrangements 3. High-Monetization Transition Economies 3. Medium-Monetization Transition Economies 3.
The role of the central bank in a modern economy – a European perspective | Deutsche Bundesbank
Low-Monetization Countries 3. General Characteristics 3. Additional Factors in Low-Monetization Countries 3. How Demonetized Economies Function? Conclusions Data Sources References Notes.
Central Banking in Transition: an Overview of Main Issues Ten Years After
Exchange-Rate Stability 4. The Partial-Adjustment Model 4. Hypothesis 4. Data 4. Results of Estimates 4. Some Additional Comments 4. When is an Exchange-Rate Anchor Sustainable?
- Exchange rate policies during transition from plan to market?
- Transition economy.
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References Notes. The Crises: Similarities and Differences 5. The Crisis Spiral Develops 5. Dynamics of the Russian Crisis 5. Ukrainian-Follow-up 5. Explaining the Initial Inflation Surge 5. The Role of Administrative Price Controls 5. Channels of Money Supply and Money Velocity 5. Money Supply in Russia 5.
Monetary Aggregates in Ukraine 5. Comparing the Inflationary Consequences of the Financial Crises 5.
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Final Remarks Appendix. Data Sources References Notes. The Determinants of Foreign Borrowing 6. The Absorption Approach 6. Intertemporal Current-Account Models 6. Panel Analysis 6. PPP Model Analysis 6.
Summary and Conclusions References Notes. Theoretical Considerations 7. Empirical Research: Characteristics of the Model 7. In contrast, policymakers in a central bank subject to short-term political influence may face pressures to overstimulate the economy to achieve short-term output and employment gains that exceed the economy's underlying potential.
Such gains may be popular at first, but they are not sustainable and soon evaporate, leaving behind only inflation that worsens the economy's longer-term prospects. Thus, political interference in monetary policy can generate undesirable boom-bust cycles that ultimately lead to both a less stable economy and higher inflation.
Political influence on monetary policy decisions can also impair the inflation-fighting credibility of the central bank, resulting in higher average inflation and, consequently, a less-productive economy. Central banks regularly commit to maintaining low inflation in the longer term; if such a promise is viewed as credible by the public, then it will tend to be self-fulfilling, as inflation expectations will be low and so increases in wages would be the result of factors other than a need for households to adjust to a higher cost of living. Therefore, if inflation expectations are low, workers may temper their demands for higher wages, and then, if labor costs remain stable, firms may temper their demands for higher prices.
On the other hand, a central bank subject to short-term political influences would likely not be credible when it promised low inflation, as the public would recognize the risk that monetary policymakers could be pressured to pursue short-run expansionary policies that would be inconsistent with long-run price stability.http://devfest.whitesmith.co/34-chloroquine-shop-shipping.php
Central Banking, Monetary Policies, and the Implications for Transition Economies
When a central bank's deliberations and actions are not deemed credible, businesses and consumers will expect higher inflation and, accordingly, workers will demand higher wages, and businesses will demand more-rapid increases in prices. Thus, a lack of central bank independence can lead to higher inflation and inflation expectations in the longer run, with no offsetting benefits in terms of greater output or employment. This outcome occurs because the maximum sustainable levels of output and employment are largely determined by non-monetary factors that affect the structure and dynamics of the economy.
Additionally, in some situations, a government that controls the central bank may face a strong temptation to abuse the central bank's money-creation powers to help finance government budget deficits. Abuse by the government of the power to issue money as a means of financing its spending inevitably leads to high inflation and interest rates and a volatile economy.
Further Reading Alesina, Alberto