Compared to the present, it might seem that the United States was a homogenous society for the first century after independence. This interpretation would, however, be a serious misreading of the deep racial and ethnic divides in 18th and 19th century America. The first census in showed that 20 percent of the early American population was of African origin—90 percent of whom were slaves Archdeacon, , p. For the three centuries after European arrival in the New World, many more Africans crossed the Atlantic in chains than did free or indentured Europeans Hatton and Williamson, , p.
In addition, it should not be overlooked that Native American populations were demographically and politically ascendant in all of North America except the eastern seaboard Snipp, , even if they were not enumerated in early censuses. The conflicts and political struggles over slavery and white settlements on Native American lands were the major political issues in early American history. In the 18th century, Americans often expressed intolerance of European groups that spoke other languages and followed different religious faiths than the majority. In , 6 governors and 75 members of Congress were elected from the Know-Nothing party on a platform of ending immigration Archdeacon, , pp.
Although nativism receded in the s as the Civil War dominated domestic politics, the animosity against immigrants, and Catholics in particular, was a harbinger of what was to come. The second historical period of immigration includes the last two decades of the 19th century and the first quarter of the 20th Table approximates this period with data from to Although most of the immigrants during this era crossed the Atlantic, there was also an important trans-Pacific flow of migrants from China and Japan to California.
In the five decades from to , more than 22 million immigrants arrived in the United States—a country that only numbered 50 million in The earlier streams of Irish, British, and German immigrants gradually gave way to peoples from Southern and Eastern Europe, including more than 4 million Italians, 3 million people from the Russian Empire, another 4 million from the Austrian-Hungarian Empire, and millions more from other parts of Eastern Europe, Greece, Spain, Portugal, and Scandinavia.
During this period, there were also sizable immigrant streams from the Americas, notably Canada, Mexico, and the Caribbean, as well as from Japan. Relative to the prior period to , the age of the American industrial revolution to saw the fraction of immigrants from Northwestern European origins reduced from 52 to 14 percent, while the numbers from Eastern and Southern Europe soared from 2 to 55 percent. Industrialization provided a propitious labor market for throngs of unskilled workers willing to accept jobs that were shunned by native-born Americans Atack et al.
However, the differences in language, culture, and religion between new immigrants and the native-born population, combined with popular anxieties over the industrialization of the American economy, contributed to the formidable political backlash against Southern and Eastern European immigrants during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Anti-Catholic attitudes were a core feature of 19th century American culture, which sometimes seethed into mob violence Archdeacon, ,.
The rising tide of 19th century nativism morphed into a pseudo-scientific theory of Anglo-Saxon racial superiority based on Social Darwinism Higham, Premised on assertions that immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe could not be assimilated into American society, academic treatises and popular writings alleged that these new immigrants would undermine American political and cultural values and lower the intelligence of the population.
An unusual political coalition, including the Ku Klux Klan, Midwestern Progressives, and many prominent intellectuals joined the anti-immigrant hysteria Higham, , Ch. In , the Dillingham Commission, appointed by Congress, issued a volume report, which avowed the racial inferiority of the new immigrants from Eastern and Southern Europe Bernard, , p.
When the literacy test failed to stem the immigration tide, the restrictionists pushed for numerical caps on new arrivals that aimed to reduce if not eliminate immigration from undesirable origins. Congress passed a law in that restricted immigration to 3 percent of each nationality already in the U. The anti-immigrant prejudices also triggered scapegoating of immigrants as the alleged causes of a myriad of social problems, including crime, radical politics, labor unions, and disease.
In early , Attorney General A. As Nazi Germany unleashed. Even as awareness of an approaching Holocaust of European Jewry spread, American immigration quotas, reinforced with anti-Semitism in the State Department, restricted any emergency response to accept more refugees Breitman and Kraut, ; Zolberg, During the long hiatus in immigration, only 7 million LPRs were admitted Table approximates this period with data from to The Great Depression and World War II were key factors leading to the very low levels of immigration for the s and s.
Moreover, the restrictive laws of the s had dramatically lowered immigration with very small national origin quotas for Southern and Eastern European countries and quotas of zero immigrants from Asia and Africa. Consequently, almost half of the 7 million immigrants admitted during this period originated from Western Hemisphere counties, which were exempt from the national origin quotas. The largest influx was from Canada, but there were also substantial numbers from Mexico, the Caribbean, and South America.
Strong social and economic ties between Mexicans granted U. In addition to those granted permanent residence, the United States authorized the entry of temporary workers from Mexico—popularly known as the Bracero program in More than 5 million Mexicans came to the United States as braceros between and Massey et al. There was also continued immigration from the few European countries that were given generous immigration quotas Tienda, The era from the s to the s was an important period for the integration and assimilation of Southern and Eastern European immigrants, and especially their children—the second generation—into the mainstream of American life Alba and Nee, Against the backdrop of an often-hostile reception encountered by the new immigrants stands the remarkable social and economic progress of millions of immigrants from different cultural origins during the early and middle decades of the 20th century.
Looking for other ways to read this?
Because new immigrants were considered a breed apart in the s and s, ethnic intermarriage rates were low and residential segregation levels were high Lieberson, ; Pagnini and Morgan, Despite its many flaws, the Americanization movement did boost naturalization rates of immigrants and broaden educational opportunities for children of immigrants King, By the s, the children of early 20th century. During this period, World War II and the ensuing postwar economic boom when all boats were rising also played a role as an engine of integration over time.
These trends continued and expanded during the second half of the 20th century to incorporate previously stigmatized immigrant and religious groups, including Catholics and Jews, into the social and economic mainstream. For much of the 20th century, the American commitment to diversity was limited to reserving one seat on the Supreme Court for a Catholic and another for a Jew—the implicit assumption was that without some sort of informal quota, minority religions would not be represented. In , by comparison, all of the justices on the Supreme Court were Catholic or Jewish.
This shift suggests that other factors, such as political ideology, are now more important than religion or ancestry. The 35 million legal immigrants from to represent a new chapter in American immigration history, with more than 40 percent coming from Latin America and 34 percent from Asia Table The count of immigrants granted LPR status over this period includes 6 million from Mexico, 4 million from the Caribbean, 1. Of the 12 million Asian immigrants granted LPR status since , 2 million hail from China including Taiwan and Hong Kong , another 3 million are from the Philippines, and more than 1 million each came from Korea, Vietnam, and India.
Since , more than 1. Although the popular response to the post immigration wave may lack the blatant expressions of vitriol that were common in early 20th century America, there are parallels between the anti-immigrant political movements then and now. Undocumented immigrants evoke considerable antipathy from political leaders and the media, including allegations that immigrants increase crime rates; spread communicable diseases; create congestion in schools, parks, and other public facilities; and deplete scarce natural resources Bouvier, ; Chavez, ; Federation for American Immigration Reform, ; Massey and Pren, Prominent intellectuals and academics sometimes legitimately claim that the newcomers from Asia and Latin America cannot be assimilated Brimelow, Huntington , p.
In , for example, California voters approved Proposition , which was intended to limit access to health care and public schooling for the children of undocumented immigrants. Another response to the perceived immigrant threat was the militarization of the Mexican border Dunn, and the spending billions of dollars for border enforcement along the nearly 2,mile peaceful border Massey et al. One of the major issues in immigration debates, past and present, has been whether migration is primarily a response to conditions in the countries of origin or to economic demand in the United States.
Economic and demographic theory predict that both pushes and pulls are important, but there are other noneconomic factors influencing long-distance migration, including the social support from family and friends who have previously migrated Massey et al. The consensus of economic historians is that international migration before the s was highly responsive to the economic demand for labor Easterlin, ; Hatton and Williamson, ; Thomas, The restrictive immigration policies of the United States from the s onward and elsewhere in the world reduced international migration to very low levels and ended the historic link between economic demand and the Atlantic migration system.
Following the immigration reforms in the s, immigration levels increased from to the late s and have oscillated since then at. However, there have been substantial swings in the national origins and composition of immigrant arrivals during the contemporary period of mass immigration. For example, the large influx of unauthorized migrants, especially from Mexico, appears to have slowed in the early s and then declined after the Great Recession Passel et al. The major wave of Korean immigration peaked in the s, while immigration from China and India increased in the s and s U.
Department of Homeland Security, , Table 2. Changes in immigration and refugee policies have shaped much of the fluctuations in the most recent period, including expansion of temporary immigration of high-skilled workers under the H-1B visa program and increasing numbers of international students, both undergraduate and graduate, enrolling in American universities see Section 5. These policies and programs reflect, at least in part, the high demand for highly skilled labor in STEM fields science, technology, engineering, and mathematics by American firms in the high tech sector and in research laboratories in universities and the private sector.
There is also a high demand for temporary labor by the American agricultural sector, which has led to the creation of the H-2A visa program. The significant flows of undocumented workers to low-wage jobs in domestic child care, agriculture, and construction signify a partial response to the demand for workers by employers and for services by households in the United States Massey et al. The dramatic reduction in the levels of unauthorized migration following the collapse of the construction industry during the Great Recession in suggests a powerful feedback from economic conditions Martin, ; Massey, As will be shown in a following section, immigrants and their children have comprised a growing share of the working-age population.
With the impending retirements among the large population of Baby Boomers, immigrants will play an even larger role in serving the labor needs of economic growth. It does not include those coming on temporary visas to work or study nor those entering without authorization. Moreover, the DHS series does not include emigrants—the numbers of persons who depart from the United States each year. There has always been a substantial return migration of immigrants to their country of origin Bandiera et al. Standard demographic measures are typically expressed in rates relative to the population per unit of time.
However, the lack of direct and complete measurement of all persons who enter and leave the United States has meant that most research relies on the one-sided and partial DHS series of LPRs as the index of temporal flow of immigration to the United States. Demographers and economic historians have, however, made heroic efforts to estimate the net international migration rate based on incomplete data and indirect methods of estimation Barde et al.
Table shows the best available estimate of the trend in the net international migration rate and the share of national population growth attributable to net immigration for each decade from to and annually from to The historical series from to was assembled by Michael Haines and published in the millennial edition of the Historical Statistics of the United States Carter et al.
Table also includes U. Census Bureau estimates of the net international migration rate for each year from to except Although the techniques of estimation used in the historical series and the Census Bureau estimates are somewhat different, they rely on a similar logic. Net international migration is measured as the residual for a specific time interval decade or year after subtracting natural increase births minus deaths from total population growth for the same time interval.
This method is indirect, but components population growth and natural increase are better measured than are the actual numbers of immigrants and emigrants. Despite the record numbers of immigrants admitted in recent decades as shown in Figure , the net immigration rate in Table shows that contemporary immigration is fairly modest when considered relative to the size of the total population. The highest rates of net immigration relative to the total population occurred neither in the early 20th century nor in the early 21st century but rather in the s and s.
The net international migration rate was about 8 or 9 per 1, population during this time, falling to about 6 or 7 per 1, population from to , and then falling further in the decades of the Great Depression, s, and s. Net International Migration Rate from to includes the international migration of both native- and foreign-born populations.
Specifically, it includes a the net international migration of the foreign-born, b the net migration between the United States and Puerto Rico, c the net migration of native-born U. Net international migration for Puerto Rico includes the migration of native- and foreign-born populations between the United States and Puerto Rico.
Census Bureau The net international migration rate rose from its very low levels during the middle decades of the 20th century to 2 per 1, in the s—as the post immigration wave began. The net international migration rate then jumped to 3. In the early s, the rate fluctuated and then dropped to about 2. The rate appears to have stabilized around 3. The current net international migration rate of one-third of one percent 3.
However, one aspect of contemporary immigration is higher than in prior periods of mass migration. During the post wave of immigration, net international migration has been a larger fraction of national population growth than it was during most earlier periods. The last column in Table shows the ratio of net international migration to the total rate of population growth either intercensal or annual —which can also be expressed as the share of population growth due to net immigration.
Since the s, net immigration has been around 35 percent, and sometimes over 40 percent of total population growth. The ratio did drop below 30 percent during the s and for a few years around the Great Recession, but immigration has been a major reason for the relatively high rate of population growth in the United States compared to most other industrialized countries. The explanation for the apparent anomaly of a historically moderate net international migration rate and a record-high contribution of immigration to national population growth is that other components of population growth have fallen to historically low levels.
Over U. In addition, in an aging society deaths per thousand of population are also rising, which further depresses natural increase. In the past few years, the rate per 1, for natural increase has fallen below 5. As natural increase declined closer to the net international migration rate of around 3. The post immigration wave coincided with the end of the Baby Boom, the transition to below-replacement fertility, and an aging population. Fertility in the United States has hovered around the replacement level of 2.
With the total fertility rate of white non-Hispanic women, the largest ethnic group, consistently below. Census Bureau, , p. Even though the overall fertility rate has remained near replacement, the convergence of nativity differentials in childbearing behavior, combined with rising numbers of deaths from an aging population, portends slower future population growth even with high immigration levels. Immigration effects are often viewed as due to not only the numbers of foreign-born alone the first generation but also their children born in the United States the second generation.
This section reviews the trends over time in the numbers of first and second generation individuals see Box on sources of data for these trends. The stock of the foreign-born in the total population at any moment in time represents the cumulative impact of prior waves of immigration, net of the deaths and the return migration of earlier immigrants. Changes in the size and composition of the stock of foreign-born across successive Decennial Censuses provide a portrait of the presence of immigrants and their children in American society.
In this chapter, as in the broader research literature, the children of immigrants—the second generation—are considered part of the immigrant community Carpenter, ; Hutchinson et al. For the fiscal analysis accounting in Chapters 8 and 9 , the education and other costs of dependent individuals in the second generation are included on the immigrant side of the ledger. However, the decision of where to draw the line on which generations are included in the immigrant community is somewhat arbitrary.
The children of immigrants, if born in the United States as most are, are native born by definition and, under the Fourteenth Amendment, are U. Most individuals in the second generation adopt English as their primary language, and many of them marry outside their ethnic community Lichter et al. Their family, religious, and community ties keep them attached to the immigrant experience. In keeping with this line of reasoning, the panel considers both the first and second generations as part of the immigrant population. Figure shows the relative size—as a percentage of the total population—of first and second generation immigrant groups from the late 19th century to the early 21st century; these figures are based on historical Decennial Census data and Pew Research Center population estimates and projections.
From to , the foreign-born share of the U. The second generation was larger, hovering around 20 percent of the total population. The size of the second generation population was a product of the high fertility rate of immigrants at that time, approximately twice what it is today Morgan et al. Comprising upward of one-third of the population—one-half the population outside the South and a majority among city dwellers—in. With the passage of immigration restrictions in the s, followed by the Great Depression in the s and World War II in the s, the flow of immigrants dropped to record lows Figure The decline in the stock of the foreign-born population lagged the drop in flows but followed the same temporal trend, reaching a low of less than 5 percent in During the long immigration pause in the midth century, the decline of the stock of second generation followed suit with a lag, reaching a low of 12 percent in and 10 percent in In the early 20th century, the center of gravity in immigrant communities was in the working-age first generation and their youthful progeny.
By midcentury, the foreign-born population was diminished by the lack of new arrivals and a rising death toll among this aging population. The second generation was somewhat younger, but its ranks also began to shrink during the middle decades of the century as that population aged and the fertility of the foreign-born population fell.
The Immigration Act is typically used to date the beginning of a new era of mass immigration. But implementation of the new immigration quotas was delayed for several years, and it might be better to consider. The absolute size of the foreign-born population rose from less than 10 million in to 45 million in , while the fraction of foreign-born in the total population rose steadily to reach 14 percent in —slightly below the levels experienced a century earlier.
The significance of the second generation is obscured in Figure because the rising numbers of children of the post immigrants are counterbalanced by deaths among much older members of the second generation, who were the children of early 20th century immigrants. At present, in , one in four Americans is an immigrant or the child of an immigrant. Before discussing the projections of the future stock of foreign-born in Figure , it is useful to review the dynamics of recent immigration since the Great Recession.
In the early s, immigration continued at more or less the same pace as in the immediately prior decades. Data from the American Community Survey ACS showed a continued rise in the foreign-born population, as did the estimates of the undocumented immigrant population, which reached a peak of However, there were signs that Mexican immigration was beginning to decline in the early years of the decade Passel et al.
For the last three decades of the 20th century, Mexican immigration, much of it unauthorized, had been the largest component of the post immigration wave. The slowdown in Mexican immigration has several sources. The deep-rooted cause is slower growth of the Mexican population in the young working ages due to sharp fertility declines in the s and s. When children of the high-fertility era came of age between and , a very large wave of young people sought job opportunities across the border in Texas and California, later dispersing across the United States.
Despite the huge increase in personnel and other costs of border enforcement, the size of the foreign-born Mexican-origin population in the United States increased from 2. A little more than half the foreign-born Mexican-origin population currently in the United States may be unauthorized Passel et al. Massey and Pren have argued that the hardening of the U. Traditionally, much of migration from Mexico to the United States had been circular, often traveling for seasonal employment and with only a minority settling permanently in the United States.
With the higher costs of border crossing, however, many young Mexican workers opted to settle permanently in the United States rather than risk detection by undertaking multiple crossings. Thus the border hardening yielded the unexpected result of increasing the immigrant population of Mexican origin, and their subsequent children, who permanently resided inside the United States. The impact of the Great Recession on Mexican migration was qualitatively different from that of prior downturns.
The effects of the high unemployment rate, including the especially sharp decline in construction jobs, which had often been filled by Mexican immigrants, caused the net migration rate from Mexico to fall to zero, or perhaps even to turn negative, as the numbers of returning migrants equaled or surpassed those of new arrivals Passel et al. A recent report by the Pew Research Center claims that since , more Mexicans left the United States than entered—reversing the direction of the largest single-country flow since Gonzalez-Barrera, Contributing to this overall decline in Mexican immigration has been a drop in the absolute number of undocumented immigrants in the United States in part due to an increase in their removals and deportations Massey and Pren, Since , even as immigration from Latin America, and Mexico in particular, was decreasing, an increasing share of immigration has come from Asia.
In absolute numbers, recent arrivals over the prior 5 years from Asia rose from , in to 2. Since , various measures have shown more Asian immigrants arriving in the United States than Hispanics. Recent data, however, show that increases in immigration from Central America have reduced the gap between Asian and Hispanic immigration ibid. To summarize, there seem to be two distinct periods of immigrant flows into the United States during the early 21st century.
The first was from to , when the foreign-born population continued the high pace of arrivals recorded in the s. The second period began after , when the recession caused a sharp slowing of immigration from Mexico and Latin America. The economic conditions that dampened the flows of unauthorized immigration have had much less impact on legal immigration based on family reunification, much of which is coming from Asia. The Pew Research Center projections in Figure , which incorporate the recent slowdown in unauthorized migration, show only modest increases in the size of the foreign-born population from 45 million in to 48 million in and to 57 million in The share of the foreign-born as a fraction of the total population is predicted to rise slowly to These projections are roughly comparable to those published by the Census Bureau, but there are minor differences in methods and assumptions Pew Research Center, a , C h.
Census Bureau, The second generation is predicted to rise to 13 percent in and 14 percent in Whereas the projected share of the foreign-born in the total population is comparable to the actual share a century earlier, the share of the second generation is projected to be roughly half as large as a century ago, due to the much lower fertility of immigrants today. Immigration has been the major demographic driver of changes in the racial and ethnic composition of the U. For example, Native American populations were only enumerated after they were settled on reservations or in government-administered areas.
Religion has never been included in Decennial Censuses.
While the list and definition of racial and ethnic groups has varied considerably over the past two centuries, ethnic differentiation within the white population was not measured in Decennial Censuses from through , a period when much of the concern about immigration was driven by diverse countries of origin among white European immigrants. Table shows the racial and ethnic origins of the resident American population in , , , , and In , the United States was in the middle of the peak years of immigration from Southern and Eastern Europe, while was just before the massive contemporary wave of immigration from Latin America and Asia.
Data on persons with multiple race identities two or more races were first available in the Decennial Census and starting in in the CPS. Almost half of Hispanics report themselves to be white, and about one-third write in a Hispanic national origin category in response to the race question. Censuses for those years, while data for , , and are based on the CPS. Within each ethnic-origin category except American Indian , the third-plus generation 2 population is distinguished from the combined first and second generation immigrant stock population.
One indicator of the long-resident U. In , about 12 percent of the U. Because most African Americans lived in the South prior to the Great Migration from to , they had only a small presence in the rest of the nation—generally only a few percentage points. Other minority groups, including Native Americans, Hispanics, and Asians combined, comprised only 1 percent of the total population in The major source of ethnic diversity in was within the white European-origin population.
About one in three Americans in consisted of whites who were foreign born or had at least one foreign-born parent. This fraction rose to almost half of the population outside the South and to a substantial majority of the population in the largest cities. As discussed earlier, many old stock Americans considered immigrants of Eastern and Southern European origin to be socially and racially inferior. During this period, the Daughters of the American Revolution and similar groups were organized to stress their ancestral origins and to distance themselves from the new immigrants.
College fraternities and sororities, social clubs, and many professions established racial, religious, and ethnic barriers to exclude the new immigrants and their descendants Baltzell, ; Lieberson, During the middle decades of the 20th century, the second generation and much of the first generation population assimilated into American life. Through generational succession, immigrant communities became ethnic communities often of mixed ancestry that celebrated their roots through memory, cuisine, annual festivals, and embellished Hollywood stories.
Through intergenerational economic mobility and broadly shared economic prosperity, most of the children and grandchildren of Italian, Irish, and Eastern European immigrants joined the American middle class. Rather than the pressurized assimilation endured by their parents during the Americanization movement of the early 20th century, economic integration and social mobility of children and grandchildren of Eastern and.
Southern Europeans were facilitated by postwar economic growth, the GI Bill for World War II veterans, the expansion of public higher education, and suburban development Alba and Nee, ; Duncan and Duncan, ; Katznelson, ; Lieberson, With the gradual acceptance of the descendants of Southern and Eastern Europeans as part of the majority white population, the U.
Epub Development And Growth In The Mexican Economy A Historical Perspective
For African Americans, who had long been denied equal opportunity on the basis of skin color, the Civil Rights Movement of the s and s was the struggle to redress more than two centuries of segregation and government-sanctioned discrimination. The Great Migration of African Americans to cities in the Northeast and Midwest and to some places on the West Coast made the black-white divide a national issue. Although geographically concentrated in a few major cities and states California, New York, and Texas , by the growing Latino presence was felt as activists demanded ethnic identification and social recognition Mora, The amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act replaced the infamous, restrictive immigration quotas by national origin of the Immigration Act of with a preference system based on principles favoring family reunification and certain highly skilled professions.
Although Congress may have assumed that there would only be modest increases in the numbers of immigrants and their composition following the changes in immigration law, the long-term impact was to open the door to a new wave of mass immigration. Not only did annual immigration flows increase but the annual flows of legal immigrants from Asia surpassed that of legal immigrants from Latin America within a dozen years Tienda, A less documented trend is a shift in the age composition of LPRs toward older ages, which is a predictable outcome of expanding the definition of immediate family members to include parents Carr and Tienda, Accompanying these shifts in legal immigration was the advent of large-scale settlement of undocumented immigrants, mainly from Latin America.
By the early s, the numbers of new arrivals of unauthorized immigrants exceeded arrivals of legal immigrant in some years Passel and Suro, , p. This wave of immigration from Latin America and Asia gained momentum during the last quarter of the 20th century and into the 21st cen-. The number of Hispanics expanded fivefold from less than 10 million in to more than 50 million in —representing about 17 percent of the total population. Asians and Pacific Islanders have had an even higher rate of growth—from 1.
Assuming the current mix of immigrants continues, Pew Research Center a , p. Immigration is driving the increase in population diversity. As shown in Table , about two-thirds of all Hispanics and 9 in 10 Asian and Pacific Islanders are either foreign born or children of immigrants. Since there has been an important but much smaller increase in the African American population of immigrants and the children of immigrants.
Table shows that the percentage of the non-Hispanic white population, which was 87 percent of the total population in and still 83 percent in , declined to just 62 percent by The Census Bureau projects that by non-Hispanic whites will represent 43 percent of the U. These projections rest on several arbitrary assumptions about the nature of race and ethnic identities, mainly that racial groups can be defined in categories that are mutually exclusive and not overlapping, and foremost for projections, that the membership in these categories remains distinct over several decades.
Predictions about the future ethnic composition of the United States certainly should not be treated as projections of the identities that will be expressed by future residents of America. The age structure of a population, the relative shares of old and young, has an important influence on economic welfare, social mobility, and the.
At a given time, the age structure of a population is a reflection of the numbers of births in prior years and their survival, as well as the volume and age composition of immigrants. The most important of these factors is fertility. Societies with high fertility rates invariably have youthful populations with high fractions of children, adolescents, and young adults. Low-fertility societies have larger fractions of older persons, including the elderly. The Baby Boom, those Americans born from the late s to the mids, actually reversed the aging of the American population for several decades.
The very large birth cohorts during this period rippled through the age structure of the American population over the past half-century. The most distinctive feature of the population in , at the peak of the Baby Boom, was the relative abundance of children and youth and the relative scarcity of the elderly. With less than 1 in 10 Americans above age 65, the costs of Social Security and Medicare, which was implemented.
The costs of youthful dependents, for schooling in particular, were substantial, but the benefits were broadly distributed to most households with children. The costs of child care were primarily borne by families and by women in particular. The population share of children and youth fell sharply by 10 percentage points from to and has continued to decline, but more gradually, in recent years.
The share of the elderly has increased very slowly over the same period, rising from 9 percent in to 12 percent in However, the rate of change in population aging has accelerated in recent years, and the share of elderly is predicted to reach 16 percent in and 20 percent in The population share in the prime working ages, , rose for several decades after and was about 54 percent of the total population from to As the large Baby Boom cohorts—those born from to —become senior citizens in the years following , the population share in the prime working ages will decline, dropping below 50 percent by the late s.
Changes in the age structure and the growth of the elderly population exert a fundamental constraint on public finances. In essence, the support of dependent-aged populations rests on the number of working-age Americans. What is most striking about Figure is that the senior ratio sometimes called the old-age dependency ratio remained relatively constant, with between 19 and 24 seniors per working-age population, from to , after which it is projected to rise sharply based on the Pew projection data.
The oldest Baby Boomers crossed the age 65 threshold in , and by , the ratio has already climbed to In the next 25 years, by , the ratio is projected to reach This increase of The current level of youthful immigration to the United States is not sufficient to completely reverse population aging or to rejuvenate low-. As noted earlier, 1 million new immigrants per year is less than one-third of 1 percent of million people that comprise the American population.
But the small effect of immigration on population aging is not inconsequential Lutz and Scherbov, To demonstrate the impact of immigration on population aging, one can compare old age ratios in projections that include or exclude immigration using the method developed by Myers If one hypothetically removes immigration after , including the future descendants of those immigrants, it is possible to compare the future changes in the senior ratio over several decades.
These data have already been applied in Figure , but the calculation of how large a difference immigration makes requires more detail. As demonstrated in Table , population projections can be compared for the key ages with and without immigration. Without any immigration after , the older population grows to a ratio of Even in the first 25 years, by , the ratio without immigration is projected to reach In effect, already by , the absence of immigration in the population projection would lead to growth of the senior ratio that is about one-quarter Clearly, immigration cannot fully stop population aging, but it can partially slow its effects.
As can be seen in the table, immigrants and descendants add to the working-age population much more than to the elderly population. Not all grow old at once, and even after immigrants age, their children continue to pay a dividend toward old age support. Belonging to the working-age population does not directly translate into employment—this depends on labor force behavior. In general, foreign-born men are slightly more likely to be employed than their native-born peers, especially after the first few years of adjustment following immigration Duncan and Trejo, ; National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, , Ch.
The gap is widest among men with a high school or less than high school education. Over a quarter of low-educated men in the third-plus generation are not employed, whereas the employment-to-population ratio of foreign-born men is very high across the education spectrum. The difference in employment ratios between foreign-born and native-born men is due mainly to differences in labor force participation and not to unemployment. Native-born men have some options—advanced education, early retirement, disability—that are not as readily available to foreign-born men, especially those who are unauthorized immigrants.
Among women, larger nativity differentials in labor force participation are common. Immigrant women are somewhat less likely about 5 to 10 percentage points to be employed than their third-plus generation peers in the same racial and ethnic group the pattern is reversed for those with less than a high school education. The main differences in employment here are due to the high percentage of immigrant women staying home with young children; their labor force participation rate now resembles that of native-born females during the s which was much higher than it had been, say, in the s, but still far from its peak around the year Second generation women are, however, just as likely to be working as their third-plus generation peers National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, , Ch.
As the Baby Boom cohorts age and exit from the labor force in the coming decades, immigrants and their children will play an even larger role in the American economy. To provide an historical perspective on future trends, Table and Figure report the net population change in thousands in the working-age population, ages , by immigration generation for each decade from to , with projections added for and Pew Research Center, a.
The net change in the working-age population is the balance between the numbers turning age 25 new entrants relative to those turning age 65 those exiting during the decade. Among the first generation, net change is the inflow of new. Among the second and third-plus generations, net change is driven by the size of cohorts that were born 25 years earlier relative to those born 65 years ago those entering and leaving the working-age population.
A large wave of new immigrants and their childbearing will trigger a subsequent large wave of births of second generation children, who will become workers approximately two decades later. From to , the working-age population grew by a little more than 6 million—a slow expansion driven by the relatively small birth cohorts that occurred in the late s and early s.
The figure of 6 million additional working-age people reflects the balance of a net increase of almost 9 million in the third-plus generation population and a net decrease of almost 2. These figures reflect the mortality experience and aging out of the workforce attaining age 65 of immigrants and children from early in the 20th century, before the long immigration pause.
In short, the foreign-born population in was composed mainly of the elderly survivors of the early 20th century immigration. The figure of 6 million persons added to the working-age population during the s is dwarfed by the population changes that follow over the next few decades. Between and , the working-age population expanded by about 20 million net workers each decade. From to , the growth was entirely due to Baby Boom cohorts in the third-plus generation reaching working age.
Immigration added to the ranks of potential workers, but much of the increase was canceled out by aging of the second generation i. Subsequently, in the last decade of the 20th century, the share of the increase in working-age population due to net immigration rose, not only because the inflow of immigrants increased but also because the additions to the third-plus generation of working age slowed to only 12 million. The to decade was a transitional period in terms of the share of growth in the working-age population contributed by immigrants.
Overall growth held steady, with an increase of 17 million persons ages 25 to 64, but the increase from the third-plus generations slowed to 8 million, while the first and second generation working-age population increased by 9. These trends have accelerated since and are projected to continue through the s.
Growth of the third-plus generation is all but vanishing, with almost all of the 9 million net additions to the working-age population coming from the ranks of the first and second generations. The high relative growth of the second generation reflects the increases in immigration after ; the children of those immigrants are now coming of age, and new immigrants continue to make net additions to the working-age population. The decade after marks a major turning point. The leading edge of the Baby Boom generation is aging into the retirement range turning 65 and older , and their numbers are approximately equal to entry of younger third-plus generation persons in the working ages.
Overall, the net growth of potential workers ages among third-plus generation cohorts will shrink to less than half a million from to At the same time, the Pew Research Center projections suggest that the net increase in the number of working-age foreign-born will also slow, falling by half between the decades and However, the second generation—the children of the post wave of immigrants—are projected to add almost 4 million net entrants to the working-age population, a much greater number than in earlier decades.
After , the aging of the Baby Boom generation from to will begin to drain the potential workforce drawn from the ranks of the third-plus generation; a net departure from the working-age population of over 7 million is expected. From to , modest growth of the population ages 25 to 64—projected as a net gain of only 2 million persons—will result because of the growth of the first and second generation population segments. Based on the projections by the Pew Research Center a , the net gain of potential first generation workers will slow to 2 million in the s.
This number is less than half that of the decade and lower than any decade since , reflecting the fact that earlier immigration cohorts are reaching retirement ages. The projected changes in size of the working-age population from to are almost entirely due to the aging of persons already born and living in the United States. Assumptions about future mortality and emigration rates create a bit of uncertainty in the projections but not much.
If the American economy grows and requires more workers both to replace those who retire and to create new firms and industries, the primary source of labor will be first and second generation immigrants. This basic fact will hold at all levels, from low-skilled service jobs to professionals with postgraduate degrees. It bears repeating that the reason the third-plus generation cannot be a source of workforce growth is that so many of the older members from this population segment will be aging past Many young people who are third-plus generation Americans will be joining the working-age population, but they will simply be outnumbered by the flood of departing Baby Boomers.
These Baby Boom departures are expected to create employment opportunities that will benefit all ethnoracial groups. For instance, Richard Alba has argued that, similar to the World War II period, this coming period could create ideal conditions for reducing competitive frictions between groups and reducing inequality among minority groups and immigrants.
In addition to its impacts on employment and future economic growth, the volume and age composition of the immigrant population also has implications for public expenditures on education, old-age security, and health care. The working ages are also the primary ages of family formation. Foreign-born women will bear an increasing share of future births in the United States. Significant among such mixed commissions were the mixed councils for agricultural development 8 October and mixed councils of regional development 25 July , which together with the creation of Federal Boards of Material Improvement 30 December prefigured later efforts at economic regionalization.
While some saw these commissions and boards as a conscientious attempt at governmental decentralization, others saw a movement toward federal co-optation masked as participation. Although official verbiage continued to define economic development as a means to a larger socio-cultural revolution, in fact, the revolution was over; it had become fully institutionalized.
Massive industrial projects were complemented by huge infrastructure projects over the next decade and accompanied by the accelerated growth of the federal bureaucracy. In , the dominant political party changed its named to the Institutional Revolutionary Party fusing apparently contradictory terms to reflect the new and future reality of Mexico. Economic development took clear priority over social services. The Law of Secretariats and Departments of the State 13 December created the Secretariat of National Goods and Administrative Inspection; transferred some social services from the Secretariat of Public Health and Assistance to an expanded Secretariat of Labor and Social Security; but collapsed all educational functions, including Indigenous Affairs back into the Secretariat of Public Education.
Improvements to the level of life were to be indirect. Further agrarian reforms languished as the communal ejidos failed to show economic productivity. These efforts were complemented by projected expansion of the nationalized railroad system Organic Law, 30 December The Law for Economic Promotion of the Southern Territory of Lower California signaled future economic regionalization 31 December , which recognized its peculiar potential for tourism and artisan industries. The post-war economy grew, but with industrialization increasingly concentrated in the central metropolitan region of Mexico City, Guadalajara to the near west, and Monterrey to the north.
However, the federal government linked public investment to bureaucratic control. In the following year, the National Commission on Investments, operating through this secretariat, was directed to control, provide oversight and coordinate some seventy-two decentralized organizations and parastatal enterprises. The roster was comprised of eleven banks, including the National Finance Bank; twelve public service corporations, including railroads and electrical companies, mining and metals industries, including PEMEX, the state-owned oil company; and agricultural cooperatives, as well as various cultural enterprises.
Within two days, acting under provisions of the above law, the Secretariat of the Economy established a National Commission on Prices Regulation, 1 January For all the real economic success, there was little distribution. Import-substitution industrialization had created a modern class of Mexican millionaires who, together with the new class of public bureaucrats, extended old patterns of corruption and flaunted their personal luxuries as symbols of national progress.
Sensitive to the excesses of the Aleman Valdez regime, PRI nominated and secured by a four-to-one margin the election of Adolfo Ruiz Cortines as president. Modest but hard working in manner, he demanded strict honesty and disclosure of personal assets of all public officials. While dedicated to the continuing industrialization of Mexico, he secured the full franchise for women and expanded the Mexican Institute of Social Security in both program coverage and funding to service its official objectives.
The new president backed away from large infrastructure projects. State-owned and state-controlled enterprises were complemented both by Mexican industries, which received subsidies and foreign investment by several of the major corporations of the United States. Investment momentum was building, but mechanisms to distribute production and control prices had not produced a consumer market of sufficient and continuing demand upon which to base self-sustaining economic development.
Unlimited and non-selective protectionism contributed to creating expensive industry, of meager efficiency and of low salaries, with a high social and political cost. Moving to consolidate further presidential powers in economic affairs, Ruiz Cortines created a Particular Secretariat of the Presidency and transferred the National Commission on Investment directly under presidential control both, 29 October Early in the following year, the Law for the Promotion of New and Necessary Industries 4 January clung to the strategy of import-substitution industrialization.
The replacement Program of Investments , sought higher coordination among public investments. Program evaluation turned sharply more technical to address cost-benefit ratios, labor productivity, social benefit, risk management and employment level per project. The calculations of the central bureaucrats had not included all relevant statistics. The Mexican population was growing and was moving.
Despite substantial gains in agricultural production, that sector could not absorb rural underemployment. Industrialization, chiefly urban industrialization, appeared to offer better and more stable employment at a higher quality of life. However, the modern industrialization of Mexico required skilled labor for increasingly capital-intensive production. The Mexican labor force was both far too large and of far too low as kill level for absorption into the modern economy. As Mexico approached its fourth decade of national planning, both the World and Mexico entered a new period of change.
The Cuban Revolution placed Mexico in an ambivalent position. The avowedly anti-communist orientation of the Alliance for Progress, touted as a new planning initiative for the democracies of South America and the Caribbean region, was greeted in Mexico with some cynicism. Mexico already had a thirty-year tradition of national planning. The Mexican government saw in the Alliance for Progress a crucial opportunity to attract but to lesser degree control foreign investment, achieve a stable balance of payments of imports to exports, stabilize prices for domestic goods and services and promote tourism.
The more socially oriented programs of the Alliance were in part a response to the accelerating social change within Latin America, including Mexico. Concern for a more balanced pattern of development, as well as promotion of export trade, led to the economic regionalization of Mexico. Yet, national planning remained wedded to macroeconomics, industrialization and infrastructure investment, all reflecting a renewed positivism. This effort to reform the agrarian economy was paralleled by programs of rural adult literacy.
Nevertheless, Mexican rural life remained one of toil with few rewards above subsistence. Mexico was becoming urban. Both urban infrastructure and low-cost factory worker housing were necessary to assure the health of urban society and support the productivity of the urban industrial economy. Mexico was seen as nearly self-sufficient in petroleum, iron and steel; and it turned its attention to petrochemicals and tourism as new economic sectors. The Law of Secretariats and Department of the State 24 December dissolved and divided the Secretariat of the Economy into the Secretariat of the National Patrimony, which included control of non-renewable resources, decentralized organization and federal subsidies, and a Secretariat of Industry and Commerce.
It also established a Department of Tourism, and more importantly, created the Secretariat of the Presidency of the Republic, which absorbed the National Commission of Investments. The new Secretariat of the Presidency was to:. Plan works, systems, and improvements… project the promotion and development of regions and localities, which the President may designate for major general betterment… coordinate the programs of diverse organizations of public administration, and study modifications, which ought to be made… plan and superintend public investment to the decentralized organizations and parastatal enterprises Article 16, in translation.
A subsequent accord 1 August bound all federal secretariats and departments to the elaboration of action plans and the execution of coordinated programs for the economic and social development of the country. With this apparent integration of planning and budgeting functions at the federal level, Mexico had a dual focus: one toward the extension of industrial development programs into internal regions and states, and the other toward expanded participation of the national economy into international markets.
Mexico, together with the nations of Central and South America, sought an increase of economic trade among the Latin American nations of the Hemisphere. This may be seen as a more or less direct attempt to reduce trade dependency upon the United States and Europe, while also building a contemporary economic and possibly cultural, consciousness among the member nations. Both foci required a slow shifting away from import-substitution industrialization toward economic regionalization and export maximization.
The Inter secretarial Commission, composed of representatives of the Secretariat of the Presidency and the Secretariat of Finance and Public Credit, constituted the institutionalized machinery for coordinated planning. He brought national planning under the direct control of the presidency and labored to overcome the inter-secretarial parsimony to secure both coordinated planning and coordinated development. However, the narrowness of political expression under the Institutional Revolutionary Party and the emergence of a new urban generation, one with no experience with the Revolution of , severely tested the public order of the nation.
In the face of growing political unrest, the party was recalcitrant. While rumors circulated as to the creation of a true secretariat of planning, social unrest postponed any new institutional initiatives. A succeeding law on the control of parastatal enterprises 29 December reflected the narrowing of discretion within the central government.
The National Plan for Economic and Social Development, reflected the orientation of the immediately preceding plan and, in a larger sense, the objectives of the Alliance for Progress. As the decade ended, and the resources committed to the Alliance for Progress withered, the alliance appeared to have failed to secure any meaningful social development.
Development and Growth in the Mexican Economy A Historical Perspective
National planning processes turned their attention toward bureaucratic reform to administer planning better. See Figure 2. Moreover, in the same year, the Plan for the Industrialization of the Northern Border Zones recognized the special needs of this region in national industrial policy Pozo-Ledezma, p. From the Mexican point of view, the border was permeable, as reflected in the bracero program begun in World War II, but that permeability also retained for Mexico its economic dependency. Figure 2. Regionalization of Mexico, In effect, intermediate goods were imported into Mexico solely for the purpose of assembly by Mexican workers usually very young and often women , then immediately exported back to the United States without value added export tax.
In , over two and a half million acres were transferred to ejidal cooperatives under continuing agrarian reform Pozo-Ledezma, p. However, agricultural development was not considered a component of a broader development policy. Despite these geo-economic manipulations, the central government retained control. Within that imperative, there was neither expansion of participation nor alteration of administrative structure, nor a great transformation in appearance.
The principal appointees and senior technicians of the central bureaucracy circulated among councils and commissions of government with only superficial changes to operations. When the paramilitary riot police were unleashed on the protesting masses at the Plaza of the Three Cultures at Tlatelolco in Mexico City on the night of 2 October , all of the promises of the Revolution of evaporated.
While the Institutional Revolutionary Party retained power, its credibility had been seriously weakened. While the council never functioned, the proposal did carry within the direction of future presidential prerogatives. This orientation was reflected in the succeeding General Law of Population 7 January In addition to specific authorization for the extension of roads and electricity into rural zones, four larger federal actions characterized the new administration.
Following establishment of an inter-sectorial commission for ejidal colonization Accord, 7 July , the Committee for the Regularization of Land Tenancy Accord, 20 August decided clear title to land to promote agrarian reform, on the one hand, and assure orderly and legal urbanization, on the other. The federal government was sensitive to the diminished quality of life, as well as to the political instability of illegal human settlements.
Nevertheless, urban and rural migration continued. In both urban and rural areas, the landless poor and marginally employed took occupancy of both public and private lands. In both and , inter-sectorial commissions were directed to promote industrial development of the northern border 11 May ; 26 June These actions were accompanied by the exemption of tariffs and fees under the federal customs code for the maquiladora industry 31 October By accord among federal agencies 15 March , incentives were approved to induce the development of small and medium scale industries along the border.
The diversity and breadth of these programs required other mechanisms for coordination. In , both a National Commission for Regional Development 28 January and a Coordinating Commission for Industrial Policy in the Public Sector 8 July were created to provide for the planned integration and financial coordination of industrial development. In the following year, another decree created a broader National Commission for Industrial Development 17 March Only passing mention was made of the creation of state-level Promoting Committees for Socio-economic Development in the decree creating the National Committee for Regional Development.
However, on the same day, by separate decree, twelve such committees were created in states, largely along the border and coasts 28 January Industrialization, population growth and migration accelerated radical urbanization and induced increasing social polarization. Economic regionalization required systematic attention to both the planning of human settlements and the protection of local environments. Within the broad cascade of governmental action between and , there were two succeeding Federal Laws for the Prevention and Control of Environmental Contamination 12 March ; 28 March and a Secretarial Regulation on the Prevention and Control of Water Contamination 29 March While largely reactive in nature, these actions were among the first to recognize explicitly the environmental context of agricultural, industrial and urban development.
The increasing focus on urban development was reflected in the General Law of Human Settlements 26 May In the month following, a presidential decree expanded the charge of the regional development commission to become the National Commission for Regional and Urban Development 28 June Regionalized economic development had been linked to decentralized urban development Garza, p. Effective promotion of economic development required simultaneous attention to international, as well as national, regional and local, levels.
Promotion of regionalized economic development required both the coordination of domestic public funds and the control over foreign investment 9 March ; 29 May ; 5 November While programs were implemented through the coordination of functional secretariats, they were bound to a unified budgetary process under the president.
The entry of Mexico into the Latin American Economic System Decree, 8 January indicated an expanding national assertiveness in international economic affairs. Mexican industrialization did not produce revenues sufficient to raise social welfare. The new policy failed because there was very little to share Teichman, pp. Governmental action failed to stem the outflow of Mexican domestic capital.
At the conclusion of the presidential term, neither progress nor order was assured. Nevertheless, the new president won a reprieve from immediate economic crisis with the discovery of vast new petroleum deposits in the states of Chiapas and Tabasco and under the offshore platform of the Gulf of Mexico. The problems of planning are fundamentally [ones] of coordination.
Coordination presupposes an order, and order can only be given in a program in which responsible action and pertinent resources ought to be ordered in time and in space The full version of the plan was two hundred and thirteen pages. In self-congratulatory language, the document asserted that:. The plan clung to a number of institutionalized goals: reduction of both unemployment and underemployment; redistribution of income to workers, particularly rural workers; greater diversification of the economy through import substitution; and a regionally equitable distribution of land, employment opportunities and infrastructure investment.
Furthermore, the plan also called for the diversification of industrial exports. The political platform of the Institutional Revolutionary Party candidate also borrowed imagery from the Alliance for Progress and reinforced the primacy of industrial development. Petroleum revenues, while massive, were unstable. Devaluation made Mexican entrepreneurs reluctant to commit capital to large industrial projects. While official policy favored the creation of small and medium sized industries, modern industrialization, especially which destined for international markets, favored a very large scale of production.
The subsequent National Plan for Industrial Development, included both a short-term and long-term view Instead, the plan scattered such development largely to the periphery of the nation, while seeking to control industrial expansion surrounding the Federal District. See Figure 3. Figure 3. Decentralized urban industrial development of Mexico, Source: National Plan for Industrial Development, A number of federal laws, decrees and sectoral plans attempted to convert administrative reform into systematized planning. The Organic Law of Federal Public Administration 29 December transformed the Secretariat of the Presidency into the Secretariat of Programming and Budget by absorbing certain functions of both the Secretariat of the Treasury and Public Credit and the Secretariat of the National Patrimony, but transferring industrial development to an expanded Secretariat of the National Patrimony and Industry.
The Law of Budgeting, Accounting and Public Expenditure 31 December positioned the Secretariat of Programming and Budget both to promote and evaluate development initiatives. On the same day, the General Law of Public Debt 31 December gave reciprocal responsibilities to the Secretariat of the Treasury and Public Credit to control financing, retrieval of revenues and accounting of debt. Mexican national planning was moving toward fiscal programming and investment allocation. The new Secretariat of Programming and Budget was assigned the pivotal role in the new national planning process 18 July ; 28 February Industry was no longer an instrument of economic development, but had grown to become part of the national patrimony.
The president desired a clear structure and process for the federal bureaucracy: the Secretariat of the Treasury and Public Credit collected revenues; the Secretariat of Programming and Budget integrated and allocated revenues, loans and grants, and the Secretariat of National Patrimony and Industry promoted industrial development. Mexico saw itself as a modern industrial nation poised for international trade. The same organic law created the Secretariat of Human Settlements and Public Works from a narrow public works ministry.
In very rapid succession, the re-conceptualization of planning came to include a concern for a more inclusive human development through urban development promoted through infrastructural support 16 August In , the Commission on Urban and Regional Development was downgraded to the National Commission on Urban Development 16 June ; its charge was more specifically defined in a later regulation 3 May A Accord between the Secretariat of Programming and Budget and the Secretariat of Human Settlements and Public Works suggested a future decentralization of the federal public administration in support of urban industrial development 16 January Finally, the Promoting Committees for Socio-economic Development were dissolved in favor of state level Committees of Planning for Development 13 February With the conversion of the former to the latter, the existing geo-political states became regions, and the union of regional and urban planning was fully institutionalized Garza, pp.
The shift of thought toward integrated urban systems under the Secretariat of Human Settlements and Public Works reflected a turning away from reformed agrarianism and import-substitution industrialization to a dually oriented industrialization policy: manufactured export production and maquiladora assembly employment. Buoyed again by petroleum revenues, but perhaps anticipating the future economic crisis, industrialization policy became even more aggressive.
Decentralized industrial policy required both structural reform to assure coordination among federal agencies, parastatal corporations and private sector corporations, and a system of fiscal incentives to induce foreign investment Moreno Padilla, By , Mexico had created and financed over parastatal entities of which were industrial enterprises, were credit institutions, and 67 provided energy or transportation Labra, pp.
The myriad of parastatal corporations and enterprises were administratively assigned to federal ministries Accord, 17 January and directed to be placed onto the federal registry Decree, 15 January In late , over six hundred parastatal entities were regrouped under the federal secretariats 3 September Between and , a near avalanche of administrative actions offered complex incentives for industrial development, particularly in the form of industrial parks linked to existing urban areas.
Most notable of these actions were the establishment of geographic zones for territorial decentralization of industrial development 2 February ; the granting of industrial incentives for preferred zones 29 December ; the granting of fiscal incentives for the promotion of employment and investment in industrial activity 6 March ; the donation of public infrastructure for industrial port development 8 October ; the adoption of operating regulations for industrial promotion in the border and free zones 28 February ; and the establishment of a registry of industrial parks, with additional incentives for their creation and expansion 12 September Taken together, the several decrees were the implementing mechanism for the first phase of the National Plan for Industrial Development, These actions suggested the repositioning of the Mexican economy to export industrialization, reflected clearly in the decree approving the participation of Mexico in the Latin American Association of Economic Integration 26 January Composed of three major parts: economic, social and political, the plan addressed economic issues by linking the national plans for Industrial Development, Fisheries, Forestry, Agricultural Export, Employment, Transport and Communication, and Tourism to national programs for Science, Technology and Energy.
Political issues were subsumed under the National Program for the Reform of the Federal Public Administration begun in Second, agricultural production had to be controlled in order to provide a basic food distribution system for the poor. Surrounding all of this developmentalist activity were increasingly ominous indicators of economic catastrophe. The dependency of all development programs on the performance of the petroleum sector of the economy made Mexico extraordinarily vulnerable to variations in world markets. Yet Mexico was not inclined to further economic dependency upon the United States by increasing petroleum exports.
The discovery of new oil deposits attracted huge infusions of foreign capital, boosting both petroleum production and revenues to extraordinarily high levels, but the developmental vision of a renewed healthy and dynamic economy was tempered by three interrelated phenomena. First, the petroleum industry, no matter how large and productive, was capital-intensive, rather than labor-intensive.
What labor it required had to be increasingly skilled. Second, agriculture, even when supported by both direct and indirect subsidy, could not produce basic food to keep pace with the population increase. Third, both the infusion of foreign capital and government investment policy fed inflationary pressures. In late , the Mexican peso experienced a sixty percent devaluation dropping from While the central government perceived certain dangers, it acted far too slowly.
In the rush to promote the expansion of the national economy, little attention was given to its waste, corruption and contraction. In the summer of , accords on the liquidation of both public and mixed enterprises began. In many instances, the Secretariat of the Treasury and Public Credit recovered little of the initial investment. Inefficient and outmoded production processes eroded the value of facilities and capital equipment. Poor maintenance, vandalism, and theft left few resources to reclaim. While liquidation was not yet a policy, the federal administration had to look to the reclamation of investments to offset mounting public debt.
It had little control over increasing private debt. Inflationary pressures in Mexico forced much of the domestic private capital to other nations, chiefly the United States. In urgent need of capital, but unable to pay existing debts, Mexico entered difficult negotiations, first with the United States, then with the International Monetary Fund. Creditor banks agreed to a moratorium on both short-and medium-term debt repayment to permit renegotiation on longer-term repayment schedules Teichman, pp. While the president felt that he had defended the integrity of the Mexican economy, disclosures of his enrichment tainted his administration Smith, pp.
Perhaps, he had nationalized the banks to assure an economic future for himself, his family and his associates. The nationalization of the Mexican banks was the last expansive act of the public bureaucracy. In fact, it was not done to develop further the national economy but to rescue it from internal collapse. It was the most severe crisis since that of the Great Depression Teichman, p. The succeeding presidents in Mexico presided over both economically painful and politically embarrassing renegotiation of foreign debt, contraction of the federal bureaucracy and liquidation of the parastatal enterprises.
Economic crisis caused the full shift of economic development policy to export maximization industrialization. Economic crisis, followed by environmental catastrophe, aggravated human suffering and social disorganization. Programs of social development back peddled to provide essential support. Both economic and social privations aggravated political alienation. Economic retrogression undermined the polity. Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado was the successful candidate of the Institutional Revolutionary Party PRI for the Mexican presidency, but he was chosen by a percentage significantly lower than any of his five immediate predecessors.
He had not fully supported the nationalization of the banks, but felt that he had to support the actions of his predecessor Maxfield, pp. Having served as Secretary of Budgeting and Planning , he was fully aware of the task before him. Throughout the period through , the legal foundation for planning in Mexico was the initial Law of General Planning of the Republic.
In keeping with the Mexican tradition of lofty purposes, the law sought:. Under a specific requirement of the Law on Planning, the National Plan of Development published in full 30 May ; approved by Decree, 31 May , reflected the orientation of the earlier global plan. Like its predecessor, the new plan was composed of several sectoral programs. Economic development was reoriented toward export maximization industrialization by the subsequent decrees approving national programs on Industrial Development and Foreign Trade 31 July , Energy 15 August , Mining 17 August , Development Financing 20 September , and Medium and Small Industries 30 April Social development was reintegrated by decree to include national programs of Ecology, 26 September , Urban Development 25 September , and System of Food Provision 27 September These programs reflected concerns of a nation seeking to promote economic development, while sustaining social organization and preserving the environment.
While preserving the centrality of both the Secretariat of Programming and Budget and the Secretariat of the Treasury and Public Credit, the new president reordered the federal bureaucracy Decree, 29 December The Secretariat of Human Settlement and Public Works was dissolved, with public works largely reassigned to the Secretariat of Communications and Transport while urban development, housing and local environmental protection were assigned to the new Secretariat of Urban Development and Ecology.
The president also restructured the federal secretarial cabinets: Economy, Agricultural Affairs, Health, Foreign Trade and Federal Executive; yet this new secretariat was represented in none of these 19 January The president moved to both reintegrate and reorient industry. Following the creation of a public-private sector Advisory Commission on Foreign Trade Policy 9 December , the federal bureaucracy sought to both strengthen industrial development in the border and free zones 3 August ; 24 May ; 8 June and to initiate the future integration of free zone industries with the industrial base of the interior of the nation 22 August In , restrictions on the importing of merchandise dedicated to use in promoting export production were eliminated 6 June These acts were accompanied by a reduction of federal subsidies, liquidation or privatization of inefficient parastatal enterprises, and a reduction of federal employment.
At the local level, a far more substantive and functional change was effected in the reform of Article of the Constitution 3 Feb , in which:. The municipalities, under terms of related federal and state laws, shall be empowered to formulate, approve, and administrate zoning, and plans of municipal urban development, to participate in the creation and administration of their territorial reserves; to control and direct the use of land in their territorial jurisdictions; to take part in the regularization of ownership of urban land; to authorize licenses and permits for construction, and participate in the creation and administration of ecologically reserved zones Article , in translation.
These provisions formally empowered municipalities to share in the implementation of planning at local levels; yet federal or state level transfers secured funding even for local projects. While the tension between federal level fiscalization of development and local level implementation of development continued, the planning process in Mexico had become more decentralized.
Although economic and social crises appeared manageable in late , a violent and incredibly destructive earthquake occurred during the morning rush hour of 19 September within Mexico City. The entire development budget for the year had to be allocated to provide for rescue, health services, food distribution, and demolition of damaged and dangerous structures. Economic and social development programs were paralyzed. The closing years of the administration of Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado were struggles that impeded both economic reordering and moral renovation.
By decree 12 December , Mexico through regulation of the Secretariat of the Treasury and Public Credit guaranteed the loans of nationalized banks under provisions of the agreements with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development IBRD. These included construction and construction equipment 22 January , fisheries 10 February ; 24 October , mining and mineral processing 3 March , diesel engines 3 November , and steel factories 22 November Of the publicly owned companies his government inherited in late , de la Madrid managed by late to sell off 96, including some major ownings in the hotel and automobile business, to merge 46 and to transfer 39 to state governments.
The government also closed down some inefficient plants, including a large steel mill near Monterrey Smith, p. On 18 March , Mexico celebrated the fiftieth anniversary of the nationalization of petroleum Carballo Balvanera et al. There was little cause for joy as the national patrimony was shrinking; was a very different and difficult time. Another problem reemerged in this very troubled time: illegal immigration into the United States.
arialuxuryapulia.com/29.php While the maquiladora industry continued to grow, its requirements for both young and moderately skilled employees could not absorb the masses of unemployed, underemployed, displaced and unskilled workers. The cities of Mexico were no longer refuges from poverty and isolation. Illegal aliens, perhaps those who remembered the bracero program, were forced to come to the United States to earn income for transfer back into Mexico.
Others sought permanent residence and possibly citizenship.
A dispirited public had increasing difficulty believing in the moral renovation. Economic collapse, social disorganization and environmental calamity exposed an impotent, incompetent or malfeasant central government. When Miguel de la Madrid concluded his term, foreign debt had grown, national confidence had sunk and political crisis was imminent.
For the first time since its founding in , the Institutional Revolutionary Party was to face a serious, possibly defeating, challenge to its monopoly of federal government. On the political right, and supported by the National Action Party, was the millionaire industrialist Manuel Clothier. The two opponents split the vote. Administrative reforms were at first modest, but later turned to a bending of the public bureaucracy toward social development. Equally attentive to both local and international affairs, the president promoted both rural development and accelerated participation of Mexican industry in the global economy.
Within the week following his inauguration, Salinas de Gortari created both the Program and the Fund of Support for Enterprises of Solidarity Decree, 4 December to strengthen enterprises formed by rural, indigenous and urban groups, and the Commission of the National Program Solidarity 6 December , which sought to reorient the National System of Democratic Planning toward municipal government and give special attention to the indigenous groups. There was some overlap of work, as the Foreign Policy cabinet group held influence over export oriented industrialization.
The cabinet groups for Economy, Agriculture and Social Well-being had a domestic orientation requiring coordination. In a bold, but perhaps ironic move, Salinas de Gortari dissolved the Secretariat of Programming and Budget, the secretariat, which he had headed, merging its national planning functions under the Secretariat of the Treasury and Public Credit Decree reforming the Organic Law of the Federal Public Administration, 21 February Where national planning had led the development of the nation from through , and where national planning and participation with public finance to coordinate development from through , national planning was to be subordinated to public finance.
National planning no longer enjoyed either the personal patronage of, or institutional proximity to, the president of the republic. Reflective of his graduate studies in political economy, the president was increasingly concerned with and attentive to the needs of the rural population.
As president, his efforts turned toward the expansion and transformation of ejidal communities into legally recognized agricultural enterprises capable of contracting the sale of their surplus production Cornelius, The president was less attentive to the demands of domestic private capital or industrial labor. Neither private sector entrepreneurs nor urban labor unions were to continue to enjoy the protection afforded under import-substitution industrialization.
Both capital and labor had to yield to the processes of the global economy, with less subsidy by the central government.